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Suppliers have experienced unexpected consequences for their businesses due to changing 
situations for their important customers. Such events may also occur at short notice, at least 
when it comes to necessary and radical decisions. Often suppliers are not aware of the full 
extent of these events until it is too late for them to take countermeasures, i.e. develop 
appropriate strategies. With increasing turbulence in the marketplace, it is clear that firms 
need to be aware of relationship-oriented marketing strategies. To cope with change the 
supplier and its customer will need strategies based on jointly understood action. Action, both 
strategic and operational, is based on each party’s meanings concerning why they do business 
with one another (enactment). Dependence and trust between the parties are issues in their 
construction of meaning and will therefore underlie their enactment. The purpose of this paper 
is to investigate dependence and trust between suppliers and industrial customers, 
implications for action of dependence and trust, and, finally, draw conclusions about 
dependence and trust for business strategy. 
 
Dependence. A firm can be dependent on a specific other firm due to investments in specific 
assets geared to that firm. A literature survey identifies five types of specific assets: Personal 
relations, competence, integration of governance systems, dedicated volume of 
goods/services, and product/process specialization. Another reason for dependence is the 
structure of the market, which may lack alternative providers of similar products. Then it 
becomes difficult or impossible due to large switching costs to substitute one firm with 
another for the provision of good/services.   
 
Trust. A literature survey concerning trust leads to the conclusion that important aspects of 
trust probably vary between different environments and settings where trust is an issue. Since 
trust between suppliers and industrial customers is the issue in this study, the notion and 
implications of trust among strategic decision-makers in that empirical setting would be 
important. By using the trust literature together with an empirical investigation three types of 
trust for the study are discerned: Relationship-based, competence-based and moral based 
trust. 
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Dependence and trust. There is a temporal interplay between trust and dependence. Trust is 
expectation concerning the future. Dependence differs from trust by being formed in the 
present time and may therefore become a means to avoid the problems in assessing the future. 
But when you choose to trust someone, as a consequence you become dependent. 
Interrelationship between dependence and trust is thus complex and intertwined. It varies with 
task, situation and persons involved. The order of events in time has an impact. Earlier actions 
by actors influence later ones. Trust develops stepwise in repeated encounters between the 
parties. The parties’ actions towards each other and the evolvement of action processes seem 
to be the key to understanding suppliers’ and customers’ dependence and trust. This interplay 
is in the paper illustrated with dependence and trust development in two dyads of supplier – 
industrial customer. In the cases we could discern that meaning construction with dependence 
and trust, interrelated with action, can lead to improved or deteriorated business relations 
between the parties. As in the cases patterns of virtuous circles or vicious circles may emerge. 
Expectations concerning the other party, i.e. trust, could thus change substantially, leading to 
different types of action than before. 
 
Conclusions concerning business strategy. Dependence and trust have different impacts on a 
firm’s strategy and consequently on strategic change. Dependence indicates preconditions for 
action and what action is precluded due to the characteristics of business between the parties 
in terms of specific assets and substitutability. In all, dependence sets limits for strategy, wide 
or narrow. Trust, on the other hand, can be a driving force shaping strategy, opening up 
possibilities in markets and products as well as governance systems linking parties. But lack 
of trust and deteriorating trust may also preclude business that could otherwise have been 
done. There needs to be trust backing up any viable strategy and strategic change. 
Furthermore, it is vital that the parties concerned convey in their communication what they 
consider to be meanings in their business. If they have dissimilar views on dependence, action 
may become disjointed and not understood by the other party. Likewise, openness concerning 
trust in one another is needed in order to display mutuality in trust or build mutual trust. On 
industry level trust in supplier relationships at firm level can be promoted by providing 
information exchange and arenas for that purpose to support potential business partners to 
embark upon trust development. Society, in its policy-making, can promote trust on firm level 
by clear-cut rules of the game, which – among other things – will reduce the risks that parties 
in an exchange will go to disjointed action due to different interpretations of what society 
requires from firms in business. 
 
 
1  Introduction 
 
A variety of trends in society’s economic life shapes the needs for change and development in 
business.  Increased competition threatens the survival of some firms, or may at least create a 
depressed financial situation, while others can use their strong position and increase 
dominance. Competition coupled with recession affect some industry sectors, often creating 
drastic changes for that industry. Enhanced means of communication and logistical 
development alter the notion of what constitutes a market in a geographical sense. Novelties 
of technology may transform the market in its product sense.  
 
These trends may cause changes for the industrial firms such as lost sales, bankruptcy, 
mergers, or internationalisation leading to restructured supply networks. Such events may also 
occur with short notice, at least when it comes to necessary and radical decisions. Suppliers     
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experience unexpected consequences for their businesses due to changing situations for their 
important industrial customers. Often suppliers are not aware of the full extent of these events 
until it is too late for them to take countermeasures, i.e. develop appropriate strategies to cope 
with their own need for change or survival. With increasing turbulence in the marketplace, it 
is clear that firms need to be aware of relationship-oriented marketing strategies (Sheth and 
Sharma, 1997).  
 
In this paper, the supplying relationship is focused on long-term relationships between 
suppliers and industrial customers. Within the long-term relationship transactions occur 
repeatedly. The supplier’s products and market may change over time. To cope with change 
the supplier and its customer will need strategies based on jointly understood action. Action, 
both strategic and operational, is based on each party’s meanings concerning why they do 
business with one another (enactment). Dependence and trust between the parties are issues in 
their construction of meaning and will therefore underlie their enactment. The purpose of this 
paper is to investigate dependence and trust between suppliers and industrial customers, 
implications for action of dependence and trust, and, finally, draw conclusions about 
dependence and trust for business strategy. 
 
The paper is based on a project containing three different parts. The first part was a survey 
study, in which 140 suppliers answered questions concerning innovation & technology, 
leadership & planning, supplier & quality, customer focus, employee development and 
information & benchmarking (Sundqvist, 2002). Results show that the firms scored low in 
innovation & technology and information & benchmarking. These results were supported by 
similar results in two parallel studies in two other Swedish regions. Parallel studies have also 
been performed in New Zealand showing that manufacturing firms in that country fared better 
in information & benchmarking than their Swedish counterparts (Sanner, 2003), while the 
Swedish firms scored markedly better in leadership & planning, customer focus, and quality 
& supplier focus. The second part was an in-depth study of some of the 40 suppliers with 
more than 50% of their sales going to one or two customers. These firms showed themselves 
to be less active concerning innovation and new product development, study their markets and 
competitors less and lacked to a certain extent important engineering competence. The third 
part of the project is the in-depth study of suppliers – dependence, trust and business strategy.  
 
 
2  Dependence 
 
A now classical article ”Power – Dependence Relations” (Emerson, 1962), showed how 
someone’s relation to different elements in the environment can be analysed in terms of 
dependence and power. Social relations between actors, where an actor can be either a person 
or a group, commonly entail ties of mutual dependence between the parties. A is dependent 
upon B if he aspires to goals or gratifications whose achievement is facilitated by appropriate 
actions on B’s part. Actors experience their dependence situations as contingent on 
motivation and alternative means for goal achievements:  ”The dependence of actor A upon 
actor B is 1/ directly proportional to A’s motivational investment in goals mediated by B, and 
2/ inversely proportional to the availability of those goals to A outside the A-B relation.” 
(Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978), and see dependence as the product of the importance of a given 
output to the organisation and the extent to which it is controlled by a relatively few 
organisations. 
     
 
 
   4 
Interdependence or mutual dependence means that two persons or organisations are dependent 
on one another (Thompson, 1967; McCann and Galbraith, 1981; Ring and van de Ven, 1992). 
Thompson (1967) sees mutual dependence as reciprocal, typical for situations where outputs 
from organisation A become input in B and, at the same time, outputs from B become input in 
A. Thus the organisations are not only dependent but may also influence each other’s actions. 
Marketing channel literature takes the theoretical perspective that marketing channels are best 
viewed as interorganisational systems, and researchers have observed that reciprocal 
dependence is important to the understanding of channel interaction (El Ansary and Stern, 
1972; Anderson and Weitz, 1989; Anderson and Narus, 1990; Buchanan, 1992; Gundlach and 
Cadotte, 1994). Transaction cost analysis is based on Williamson’s view that economic 
activity is more efficient when conducted either within a single organisation or in a hierarchy 
rather than in the market (Williamson, 1975; Williamson, 1985). Nevertheless, in later years 
researchers have extendend and modified transaction cost analysis to include bilateral 
dependence on the market (Johanson and Mattson, 1987; Heide and John, 1988; Heide, 1994; 
Noorderhaven et al., 1998; Joshi and Stump, 1999; Buvik and Grönhaug, 2000). 
 
Interdependence does not necessarily mean that both parties are dependent on one another for 
the same reason or to the same extent. Asymmetry is a common theme in the literature 
(Williamson, 1985; Heide and John, 1988; Buchanan, 1992; Gundlach and Cadotte, 1994; 
Kumar et al., 1995; Joshi, 1998). Dependence can be balanced or unbalanced (Emerson, 1962; 
Jacobs, 1974; Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). In the latter situation one party dominates the 
relation. The literature often contends that the firm should avoid depending on trade partners, 
but there are also studies indicating that dependence can bring the firm benefits (Lusch and 
Brown, 1996). Interdependence and asymmetric relations between suppliers and their buyers 
have been investigated (Friedman, 1977; Rainnie, 1989; Robinson, 1989; Blackburn, 1992; 
Morris and Imrie, 1992; Raffa, 1992; Gadde and Håkanssson, 1993; Lamming, 1993; Lyons 
and Bailey, 1993; Curran and Blackburn, 1994; Lusch and Brown, 1996; Lilliecreutz, 1998; 
Noorderhaven et al., 1998).  
 
What constitutes dependence? A firm can be dependent on a specific other firm due to 
investments in specific assets geared to that firm. When a firm makes a specialized 
investment in its partner, transaction-specific assets will exist (Williamson, 1985). It will be 
dependent on another firm through assets specifically geared towards the exchange partner, 
assets which can not at all or only by incurring large switching costs be used for other 
exchange partners. We can identify five types of specific assets: Personal relations, 
competence, integration of governance systems, dedicated volume of goods/services, and 
product/process specialization. Another reason for dependence is the structure of the market, 
which may lack alternative providers of similar products. Then it becomes impossible or 
difficult due to large switching costs to substitute one firm with another for the provision of 




There is a debate among researchers whether relations between organisations are 
characterised by discrete transactions implying limited communication and narrow content or 
by relational exchange (Ring and van de Ven, 1992). Relational exchange means that each 
transaction must be viewed in terms of its history and anticipated future. In relational 
exchange the participants can be expected to engage more in social exchange and norms are 
based on the expectation of mutuality of interest, essentially prescribing stewardship 
behaviour, and are designed to enhance the well-being of the relationship as a whole     
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(Macneil, 1980). The actors invest more in joint activities and resources and in long-term 
commitment (Johanson and Mattson, 1987). The duration of a relationship is likely to affect 
the parties’ expectations that the relationship will continue (Ganesan, 1994; Berger et al., 
1995). The parties adapt to one another in order to support and possibly expand current 
business. Adaption has an impact on dependence (Dwyer et al., 1987; Hallén et al., 1991). 
Relational flexibility, information exchange and solidarity between the parties affect 
dependence (Joshi and Stump, 1999).  
 
Need for the exchange partner’s competence may create dependence of one firm on another 
(Håkansson, 1989; Robinson, 1989; Lamming, 1993; Gadde and Håkanssson, 2001). It may 
also include the exchange partner’s knowledge upstream, such as the market for raw material, 
or downstream, e.g. marketing policy for the ultimate consumer market (El Ansary and Stern, 
1972).  
 
Efficiency in the flow of goods/services between suppliers and customers may entail 
integration in systems for order, delivery and payment (Robinson, 1989). By IT-systems such 
as Just-in-time delivery and Electronic Data Interchange (EDI), as well as specific logistics 
solutions, parties adjust their administration to each other forming interdependent governance 
systems (Ragatz et al., 1997; Gadde and Håkanssson, 2001). Business with one party becomes 
facilitated more in a relative sense as compared to parties where no joint governance system is 
applied (Raffa, 1992; Lilliecreutz, 1998). A high degree of vertical integration is partnerships 
with selected suppliers, with whom joint systems will be developed and become specific 
assets. This will increase dependence (Heide and John, 1990). Ownership is the ultimate form 
of control. 
 
If a high relative volume of goods/services provided by a firm is dedicated to one party there 
is resource dependence (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978; Buvik and Grönhaug, 2000). The volume 
may also be essential as a contribution to profit (El Ansary and Stern, 1972) and constitutes a 
large market share (Hallén et al., 1991). The same logic that relative volume makes relative 
dependence applies to both selling ands buying (Gadde and Håkanssson, 1993). 
 
Apart from dedicated volume, a focal firm can also be dedicated to another party by 
specialization of its goods/services (Raffa, 1992; Lyons and Bailey, 1993), i.e. there are, due 
to specialization, fewer alternative buyer/sellers available for that product. The notion of role 
performance indicates that the one party lives up to the needs of the other party by 
specialization (Heide and John, 1988). The focal firm’s investment in specialized production 
and processes geared to the needs of a specific firm may create dependence also in the future. 
Specialization entails dependence when the specialized product would bring large switching 




Dependence is increased when the market has fewer or no potential alternative sources of 
supplier or customer (El Ansary and Stern, 1972; Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978; Heide and John, 
1988). The structure of the market is such that it may be impossible to substitute one 
exchange partner for another (Jacobs, 1974).  
 
 
3  Trust 
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Trust as a more or less prominent issue has been increasingly studied by e.g. psychologists, 
sociologists, economists, management and marketing theorists and in philosophy (Barber, 
1983; Hosmer, 1995). There appears to be a widespread agreement on the importance of trust. 
But as a multifacetted phenomenon lacking agreement on fundamental definitions it lends 
itself to being grasped and summarised by different views on it.  
 
There are preconditions for trust to emerge in a social setting (Parsons, 1969). All participants 
must believe that action is aimed at common values. In a business setting, common values 
like the belief in the market system and professional behaviour as a businessman 
(“businessmanship”) would be important. These common values must then be possible to 
translate and convey to common goals. Profitability, survival and development of the firms 
would be such goals. Parsons (1969) also contends that each participant’s expectations must 
generally fit into his or her general set of solidarity involvement. In a business context this 
could be exemplified by joint interests in development of the technology of the actors’ 
specific industry or survival of business in the area where they are located. Finally there is an 
issue of role fulfilment: The participants should see each other as belonging to the same or an 
expected social setting, i.e. “be one of us”. In sum, there is a need for the parties in a trusting 
situation to relate the persons or the organisations to one another. This could be attained by 
knowledge of each other, experiences together in the past and maybe also some feeling of 
affinity.  
 
Two main views of trust can be found in the literature: The first view is trust as the chosen 
expectation of One that Other will do something in the future that will favour One (see e.g 
(Luhmann, 1979; Barber, 1983) or at least not put One in a detrimental situation. The second 
view is based on One’s confidence in Other’s goodwill, i.e. Other’s moral integrity.  
This article contends that these two views converge in any social activity concerning trust. 
When One expects Other to act in One’s favour, this expectation will have no meaning if One 
at the same time does not have confidence in Other’s goodwill. You simply would not have 
expectations of a person whose moral integrity you do not believe in – unless you have no 
choice but to put your destiny in somebody else’s hands. You choose to expect, otherwise it is 
not a matter of trust (Dasgupta, 1988). Furthermore, confidence in goodwill is a state of mind, 
which becomes important in social action only by connection to expectation. You can have 
confidence in a person or organisation in your mind, but this will have social consequences 
only when you enter into some activity involving that person or organisation (Gambetta, 
1988). At that moment expectation also becomes an issue. 
 
This paper also contends that a complex phenomenon like trust will never be universally 
defined, i.e. will never be characterized by one definition that can be used for any theoretical 
purpose. Definitions have to be elaborated due to specific research issues and study aims, in 
which different aspects of trust become important: Vulnerability, dependence and 
commitment are examples of such aspects. In this vein, the wide variety of definitions of trust 
or its aspects that are used in different studies can be explained. Some examples: Process 
trust, characteristics trust and institutional trust (Zucker, 1986); economic trust (Larson, 
1992); contractual trust, good will trust (Sako and Helper, 1998); personal trust (Luhmann, 
1979); system trust (Giddens, 1990); competence trust (Barber, 1983); cognitive trust, 
emotional trust, behavioural trust (Lewis and Weigert, 1985); information, influence and 
control conceptualised trust (Zand, 1972); enterprise-based trust (Sanner, 1997); interfirm 
trust (Gulati, 1995); intentional trust (Nooteboom et al., 1997); calculated trust (Anderson and 
Narus, 1990); and commitment trust (Tillmar, 2002). 
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Aspects of trust probably vary between different environments and settings where trust is an 
issue. Since trust between suppliers and industrial customers is the issue in this study, the 
notion and implications of trust among strategic decision-makers in that empirical setting 
would be important. Therefore, in order to compare and verify trust with the trust literature, 
interviews were made with four CEOs in supplier companies and one director of a customer 
company’s Purchase department. The question to be answered and elaborated was: What is 
trust between a supplier and an industrial customer? In the Appendix to this paper 49 
statements from the respondents are noted.  
 
The statements concern a wide array of opinions, experiences, hopes and fears concerning 
trust. However, they can be grouped into three strands: Relations, competence and morals. 
 
Firstly, the respondents indicated as important for trust: Respect for each other, a working 
dialogue – also when problems arise, flexibility and adaptability before the other party, 
willingness to solve problems and take corrective action, willingness to give help when 
needed, display understanding, “personal chemistry” between the persons in charge of 
contacts, i.e. relation-based trust. 
 
Secondly, to promote trust they also indicated professionalism in running the business, 
efficient management, quality in products and processes, timeliness in delivery and payment, 
work in accordance with stated or agreed requirements, i.e. competence-based trust. 
 
Thirdly, a number of statements concerned general ethics and morals: honesty, fairness, 
keeping promises, honouring agreements, standing by one’s word, reciprocity and mutuality 
in situations where you should yourself live up to what you demand from others, “stick to the 
rules of the game”, to have businessmanship as a basic value when doing business. This can 
be labelled moral-based trust. 
 
The three strands are partly overlapping, but give a broad picture of the meaning of trust in 
the empirical environment of the study. As can be seen above the meaning of trust does not 
differ from what could be found in the literature, it is only more focussed.
1
 The three notions 




4  How dependence and tust interplay  
 
Any social situation with trust implies expectation. Expectation is laden with some 
uncertainty about whether it will be honoured or not. Expectations not fulfilled will put the 
truster worse off than if they are fulfilled. The penalty (disutility) One suffers if Other abuses 
One’s expectation may be greater than the benefit (utility) One gains if Other does not abuse 
that expectation (Deutsch, 1962). Hence the truster will expose himself and become 
dependent on the trustee (Dwyer et al., 1987).  
 
                                                 
1
 Close in meaning to relation-based trust come process-based (Zucker, 1986) personal trust (Luhmann, 1979) 
and behavioural trust (Lewis & Weigert, 1985). Competence-based trust has a similar notion, competence trust 
(Barber, 1983). Zucker's (1986) notion of institutional based trust as well as Barber's (1983) and Parsons' 
discussions concerning the role of the professional contain what is here denoted as moral-based trust.     
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Seen in a time perspective One forms expectations and enters into dependence with Other at 
one point of time and experiences expectations as fulfilled or not due to Other’s behaviour at 
a later point of time. There is a temporal interplay between trust and dependence. “Trust 
concerns the future, as a complexity reduction involving a problematic relationship with 
time.”…”It is to behave as though the future were certain” (Luhmann, 1979). Dependence 
differs from trust by being formed in the present time and may therefore become a means to 
avoid the problems in assessing the future. One offers Other dependence in confidence that 
Other will not abuse One’s dependence (Nooteboom et al., 1997). Trust will be the conscious 
regulation of One’s dependence on Other that will vary with the task, the situation and the 
other person (Deutsch, 1962). 
 
There are two causes for dependence. One cause is dependence that mirrors power (Emerson, 
1962). The scope and character if this dependence is determined by the power holder. It is 
involuntary and enforced upon the dependent. Dependence based on power may exist without 
any trust. The second cause for dependence is trust. (Heide and John, 1988). You choose to 
trust someone and as a consequence you become dependent (Luhmann, 1979; Dasgupta, 
1988). You enter into this dependence because you deem some expectation of something to 
be important. If dependence were too cumbersome, you would hesitate to trust. Therefore, 
you can determine whether or not to enter into this voluntary form of dependence, and have 
an influence on its scope and character.  
 
As discussed above, dependence can be symmetric or asymmetric between the parties. 
Reciprocal dependence may thus be a balanced or unbalanced. This has implications for trust 
between the parties. The issue has been studied. Dependence imbalances are of relatively 
minor importance if trust is developed. If the less dependent trusts the more dependent, both 
parties want mutual trust to remain and the less dependent will not use his superiority (Kumar 
et al., 1995; Geyskens et al., 1996). The issue deserves more studies since there is also 
opposite evidence that dependence asymmetry affects trust in a negative way (Anderson and 
Weitz, 1989). 
 
Asset specificity would normally be interrelated with trust. Whether it is based on investments 
in personal relations, dependence on the exchange partner’s competence, joint governance 
systems, high relative volume of goods/services exchanged or specialization towards the 
exchange partner, these investments would not have been made without trust between the 
parties (Johanson and Mattson, 1987; Heide and John, 1988; Gadde and Håkanssson, 2001). 
 
Interrelationship between dependence and trust is complex and intertwined. It varies with 
task, situation and persons involved. The order of events in time has an impact. Earlier events 
by actors influence later ones (Anderson and Narus, 1990; Hallén et al., 1991; Gundlach and 
Cadotte, 1994; Geyskens et al., 1996). Trust develops stepwise in repeated encounters 
between the parties (Luhmann, 1979; Dasgupta, 1988). The parties’ action towards each other 
and the evolvement of action processes seem to be the key to understanding suppliers’ and 
customers’ dependence and trust (Zand, 1972; Dwyer et al., 1987; Larson, 1992; Ring and 
van de Ven, 1994). 
 
 
5  Enacting dependence and trust  
 
Enacting refers to people’s concern with making sense of events and experience as a 
condition for entering into action. It is a process where they attempt to construct meaningful     
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explanations for situations as a basis to decide to act, what action to take or not to act at all. 
People engage in ascribing or imposing meaning upon experience including their own actions 
and use the imposed meaning as a basis for subsequent understanding and action. Thus 
meaning construction and action become intertwined (Weick, 1979). Meaning construction 
and action is not a sequential process in the way of one first and then the other. Enacting will 
be personal in that people use intuition, imagination, vision, revelatory flashes of insight, and 
creative problem solving in the construction and use of meaning (Gioia, 1986) Enacting will 
also be contingent upon personal experience, professional competence and abilities. At the 
same time, human thinking and social functioning are essential aspects of one another in 
enacting (Weick, 1995). 
 
Enactment concerns outcomes lying ahead and action to come. The future is equivocal, 
though. Businesspeople need to reduce the abundance of information by meaning in order to 
act (Gartner et al., 1992). But there can be many possible meanings for a person in one 
situation and a multitude of clues for information seeking. Clues are often sought in the past. 
We therefore often attend to new situations as if they were earlier experienced situations, 
retrospective sensemaking (Weick, 1979; Weick, 1995) The idea of retrospective 
sensemaking derives from Schütz’s analysis of “the meaning of lived experience” (Schutz, 
1967). The past is singled out to guide the present and the future. Retrospectiveness resides in 
the basic values and beliefs of a person and experience stored in the memory as interpretative 
schemes.  
 




- accommodation  
 
      
     Basic values 






     Interpretative       
        schemes 
 
Figure 1. Enactment  
 
Attention, clue seeking and selection of information 
 
The environment brings the individual information for enacting. For any specific situation, 
where the individual perceives a need or a potential need to act, the entire datum of 
information tends to be abundant. There is a problem concerning what information to attend 
to. So the individual needs guidance regarding what information to distinguish for further 
attention and use, i.e. to reduce complexity (Luhmann, 1979). Now an interplay starts 
between attention to information and creation of meaning. In the selection of information 
clues are needed. Clues work as reference points in the large and complicated quantity of 
Attention  Action     
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information (Weick, 1979). A meaning attributed at the start of the process can change and 
develop as a result of the clues selected and applied to information selection. The individual 
can in an active role through meaning development produce change in her/his environment 
due to information selected. Attention, clue seeking and selection of information is to a 
greater or lesser extent done by the individual in conjunction with others. 
 
Basic values and beliefs 
 
Basic values and beliefs pervade the individual’s assumptions about the nature of the world, 
the role their organisation will play in society, the nature of human beings, truth, 
relationships, time and space (Schein, 1983). Basic values, even when the bearer is less 
conscious of them, are expressed in beliefs, assumptions and ideas. Beliefs as rooted in basic 
values are also stable over time but nevertheless more influenced by meaning construction 
and reconstruction and may therefore change and develop more than basic values. Attention 
and action performed may reconstruct meaning and, by that, change beliefs. Conscious or not 
conscious basic values and beliefs will form and activate the individual’s construction of 




People develop ways of economising on information and lessening the task of handling the 
myriad of potentially meaningful clues for action available (Gioia, 1986). This choice 
problem is difficult and laborious, so they need to simplify. From earlier occasions they use 
experience that has been stored in memory and brought forward again. Structured, pre-
existing knowledge is used to interpret the situation and generate appropriate action. The 
notions of interpretative scheme and scheme will be used as synonyms denoting structured 
sets of pre-existing views, and patterns of events/actions that can contribute to meaning and 
action.  
 
Assimilation and accommodation of experiences 
 
Meaning construction and understanding involves association of experience with existing 
interpretative schemes, and alteration by incorporating new interpretative schemes. To handle 
that, the literature (Gioia, 1986) sometimes uses the notion of “Piagetian framework”, in 
which assimilation denotes the incorporation of experience into existing schemes (integration) 
and accommodation refers to construction or alteration of schemes in the face of experience 
(creation). These processes are either intentional, and therefore under the person’s control, or 
automatic, not conscious. 
  
Dependence and trust as constructed meaning  
 
The broad overviews in sections 2-4 above indicate dependence and trust to be important in 
the supplier’s and industrial customer’s enactment of business. Each of the parties involved 
uses his interpretative schemes about the other in terms of dependence. How is our 
relationship? Do we need the other party’s competence for our business? Possible joint 
governance systems are interpreted, just like dependence on volumes and specialization. 
Could there be reasons for substitutes, an alternative provider/customer? The aspects of 
dependence reside in values, norms and beliefs, memories from earlier enactments between 
the parties as well as attention to recent information at hand and clue seeking. Enactment then 
includes the analogous constructed meaning from the other party, relative dependence     
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(Emerson, 1962; Kumar et al., 1995; Noorderhaven et al., 1998). Enactment will include both 
separate and joint action (maybe also joint assessment on dependence in an open atmosphere). 
 
Likewise, a truster gives attention to information in which expectation concerning the trustee 
is worked upon, clues are bracketed and elaborated in a construction of meaning. Basic values 
and beliefs concerning trust as well as trust from earlier occasions (Anderson and Narus, 
1990) residing in interpretative schemes will be interpreted and brought to the meaning 
construction. Expectations as constructed meanings concerning a trustee will be an element in 
action formed and entered upon (Dwyer et al., 1987). Experience concerning trust in the 
action performed will be worked upon and assimilated or perhaps accommodated into 




Several enactments over time form action processes. The successive enactments will be 
contingent on earlier meanings as well as attention to information on a specific occasion. By 
assimilation and/or accommodation interpretative schemes are used repeatedly and may 
change in the process. Basic values tend to be stable over time, beliefs may change slowly. 
Action follows, and will as experience become part of the interpretative scheme. An action 
process can thus be seen as a chain of interrelated enactments. 
 
 
6  Dependence and trust in two dyads – an illustration 
 
To illustrate dependence and trust enacted in an action process two dyads will be presented: 
Two suppliers each in a dyad with an industrial customer.  
 
The industrial customer will be labelled Machinery Inc, a manufacturing company. 
Machinery dominates a rather small town in the middle of Sweden. It was started in 1904 and 
has since the 1910’s been multinational, nowadays with plants and subsidiaries in more than 
40 countries. In its specific manufacturing field, Machinery holds 70 % of the world market. 
Annual turnover for the whole group worldwide is 8134 Sw. Mkr in 2002, and for 
Machinery’s activities in the small town 380 Sw. Mkr. Nevertheless, the company has been in 
a difficult financial situation during the last five years and has made efforts to reduce costs in 
several ways. One way is outsourcing such activities that are not defined as core activities. 
  
The supplier Techno Inc. is a company based on metal cutting and was originally outsourced 
from Machinery in 1994. Two years later Techno bought outsourced production from another 
company. Today Techno is sister company in a family-owned group of two firms in the same 
niche. The basis for Techno was a mechanical engineering shop, which still is on Machinery’s 
premises, and 34 employees, which has now increased to 60. Turnover is 50 Sw mkr. 25-50  
% of its turnover is sales to C as compared to almost 100 % in the beginning. In all, 80% goes 
to large Swedish multinationals. A goal is to increase turnover to small and new customers, 
while still keeping the volume of sales to the large buyers. Techno also aims at producing 
more downstream, i.e. doing more construction work and assembly for its customers. 
 
The supplier Electro Inc. is a company in cabling, mechatronics and electronics, situated 160 
km from Machinery. Electro is family owned and has existed since 1982. When Machinery in 
1998 decided to outsource this part of the production, Electro took over machinery, stocks and 
15 employees to form a department in Electro. This department was still situated in     
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Machinery’s town and on Machinery’s premises. Some new equipment was bought. Beta 
planned to get new customers for this manufacturing niche. But things went wrong. 
Cooperation between Machinery and Electro was hampered by malfunctioning procedures of 
order and delivery. Several attempts to improve routines failed. Relations between the 
management of the two companies became strained. Finally, both parties agreed on breaking 
the agreement. Today they have no business in common. Two other firms have taken over the 
outsourced activities. 
 
Descriptions and analyses of business in the two dyads are based on interviews with the 
managing director and the director of the purchase department in the relevant part of 
Machinery, the managing directors of two suppliers Techno and Electro and studied 
documents were studied from the three companies. 
 
Dependence and trust in the action process with Techno – Machinery  
 
At the start, as a supplier, Techno was very dependent on Machinery. Techno took over the 
staff from Machinery. As a consequence there were tight relationships, so tight that the staff 
at the company even had problems seeing themselves working in another company. There 
were also very tight connections in ordering and delivery, partly since the companies were 
located in the same area.  In the beginning nearly 100 % of the orders to Techno came from 
Machinery. Mutual dependence was very high, since also Machinery looked upon the new 
company as its former department. The situation has changed throughout the years, though. A 
new CEO at Techno, coming from another company intensified marketing to new potential 
customers. Successively, the turnover expanded by sales to new customers. Machinery’s 
orders now account for 30 % of Tehno’s turnover. Both companies express satisfaction that 
Techno’s dependence has decreased. Machinery sees the advantage of Techno learning from 
other customers and also that also other firms share in contributing to Techno’s overhead 
costs. The purchasing director of Machinery expressed it: 
 
“They were very clever to quickly get new customers and saw us as a starting aid. We have now a win-win 
situation with Techno. They invest in machinery and equipment in a way that we believe in increasing quality in 
their products. We need very little discussion with this supplier”. 
 
And in the words of Techno’s CEO: 
 
“I think we have brought down dependence on them to a good level today. It works well. We have a good 
business relationship and therefore we co-operate in natural way and we pull in the same direction.” 
 
Machinery expresses trust in Techno by the way the supplier has handled its expansion on the 
market and its willingness to invest for that purpose (competence-based trust). Techno, in 
turn, has high relation-based trust in Machinery, shown by the way they handle negotiations: 
They both care for the continuous relationship between the firms. In some other customer 
relations Techno meets customers that are only using discussions to press down prices. 
Techno’s CEO expresses moral based and relation based trust: 
 
“Machinery is an honest firm. It is a matter of values. They are prepared to take and give in an open way. And 
we respond by giving them help in different ways now when they have some problems ” 
 
The firms thus started out with similar basic values and beliefs in their roles in business. 
Interpretative schemes were similar, since backgrounds were similar. Techno went into action 
that accommodated less dependence and more trust in its counterpart’s interpretative schemes.     
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Machinery, in its turn, displayed in many ways trust towards Techno and backed up the joint 
aims of a wider market for the outsourced company, which brought self-assurance to Techno 
(accommodation).  
 
The development by enactments in the action process has been facilitated by the tight contacts 
between the employees of the firms. Interaction is daily in large or small transactions. So 
altogether: There is much attention to information between the parties. Aided by similar 
values, beliefs and interpretative schemes accommodating trust and a mutually beneficial 
level of dependence, they see their interaction as having meaning. Then action runs smoothly 
between the parties, facilitating their business.  
 
Dependence and trust in the action process with Electro – Machinery 
 
When Electro bought the business in one of Machinery’s departments and integrated it with 
Electro, it also took over resources from Machinery (people, equipment, building). The 
former department continued to operate as earlier, since no additional customer came into 
play. Dependence was high due to close relations and a high relative volume of products 
purchased. In addition, Machinery’s governance system prevailed: procedures for ordering, 
production planning etc. Specialization in products towards Machinery was very marked. The 
new management in Electro made some investments and planned to expand its market. But 
problems arose in its relations to Machinery. Electro wanted to change the governance system 
towards Electro’s own. Machinery did not comply with these changes. External consultants 
were engaged to work out solutions, but the two managements did not agree on solutions to 
all the stated problems. Electro demanded economic compensation for their more expensive 
production. Part of the dispute was settled. Then suddenly Machinery quickly cut the orders to 
Electro by 50 %. Electro cancelled all agreements with one month’s notice. For some of the 
disputes lawyers were hired and the dissention was brought to court. The branch of Electro in 
the town of Machinery closed down. The rest of Electro – in another town – is prosperous. 
 
The parties planned to reduce dependence over time together. Since no expansion of Electro’s 
market came and settling the disagreement failed, dependence did not change. Trust was high 
on both sides from the beginning, but process-based trust and competence-based trust 
deteriorated quickly. Electro’s CEO: 
 
“We worked hard for them in the beginning. We believed in Machinery. But they took too long to decide on 
rather small matters, sometimes half a year. Promises were broken. They would stick to anything they had done 
for 30 years. Gradually we lost confidence in them. If we had continued with them, we would have been broke 
today, the whole company.” 
 
The comment of Machinery’s purchasing director:  
 
“Electro did not succeed in getting any synergy out of the cooperation. Only the manager was new. They 
continued to work as a department within Machinery. No positive effects, only worse and worse. So we had to 
break off doing business with them. Now we let their successors as suppliers come in to have influence on the 
construction of our products.”  
 
Communication between Electro and the purchase officer in Machinery was good, but 
management turnover in Machinery made it difficult to develop good relations with its 
managers. Deteriorated trust (or development of a process of distrust; cf Luhmann, 1979) 
could not be compensated for by existing high dependence. 
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The two firms did not discuss enough what they expected in the agreement with the other 
party. Electro’s CEO: 
 
“We should have had much more accurate documentation from the beginning. And we should have listened 
much more to the other party’s way of thinking. We were two parties who believed we agreed. But we were 
thinking along two quite different lines.” 
 
Basic values and beliefs were not congruent between the parties. In the process they also 
displayed different views on how procedures should work and how to cooperate in an 
efficient manner, i.e. they had different interpretative schemes. When basic values and beliefs 
differ, it is probably difficult to accommodate experience from action into schemes to make 
them more alike as a basis for improved jointly understood action. Instead, in this case, due to 
the differences, accommodation constructed more distance in meaning concerning trust 
between the parties. Attention to information and clues to the needs of action was disturbed. 
So the parties could not understand each other’s actions, and action became disjointed. 
Mutual dependence still was at hand, and there was a need for co-operation, but the need 
could not be fulfilled due to lack of trust, which led to the situation becoming untenable and 
subsequently running into a clash. 
 
Patterns of enactment: Virtuous and vicious circles in the cases. 
 
In the two cases we have seen that a chain of meaning construction with dependence and trust 
interrelated with action can lead to improved or deteriorated business relations between the 
parties. As in these cases patterns of virtuous circles or vicious circles may emerge (Merton, 
1968). Attention to information concerning dependence and trust may have an impact on 
meanings in the minds of each party. Similar or dissimilar meanings between the parties 
affect action taken. Action may be jointly understood or the other party’s action may not be 
understood. In either case enactment will become retrospective in that it brings assimilation or 
accommodation of meaning to existent interpretative schemes. Thus enactment has an impact 
on further action. In the cases we could discern that expectations concerning the other party, 
i.e. trust, could change substantially, leading to different types of action than before.  
 
 
7  Conclusions concerning dependence and trust in business strategy 
 
As discussed above (section 4) dependence is formed in the present time, while trust concerns 
expectation for the future. So meanings of dependence and meanings of trust have different 




Dependence indicates preconditions for action and what action is precluded due to the 
characteristics of business between the parties in terms of relational exchange, the parties’ 
competence needs, interrelated governance systems, relative volume of goods and services, 
specialization and substitutability. Given possible action in the present, dependence can be a 
means to avoid future problems. In all, dependence sets limits for strategy, wide or narrow. If 
a supplier wants to change its strategy towards an industrial customer – and vice versa – it 
may need to back up the change by altering the basic relationships in terms of dependence. 
However, some strategic changes may then be out of reach. 
                                                 
2
 Strategy is a notion covering contents (goals, ways to reach goals) and processes (future-oriented thinking, 
planning, learning)     
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Trust has been called “an important lubricant in any economic system” (Arrow, 1974), which 
implies trust as a facilitator for business. Trust, based on relations, competence and morals, 
can be a driving force shaping strategy, opening up possibilities in markets and products as 
well as governance systems linking parties. Trust can be an important ingredient in a positive 
development of relations, forming e.g. virtuous circles. But lack of trust and deteriorating 
trust may also preclude business that could otherwise have been done. There needs to be trust 
backing up any viable strategy and strategic change. 
 
It is vital that the parties concerned convey in their communication what they consider to be 
meanings in their business. If they have dissimilar views on dependence symmetry or 
asymmetry, action may become disjointed and not understood by the other party
3
. Likewise, 
openness concerning trust in one another is needed in order to display mutuality in trust or 
build mutual trust. 
 
As discussed above in this paper (Section 1) suppliers experience unexpected consequences 
for their businesses due to changing situations for their important industrial customers. Often 
suppliers are not aware of the full extent of these events until it is too late for them to cope 
with the consequences. But in a relationship characterized by information and trust, signs of 
coming events and situations can be discovered earlier. This may in its turn facilitate 
countermeasures, e.g. developing appropriate strategies to cope with the supplier’s own need 
for change or survival (jointly understood action).  
 
This study has specifically studied trust in one type of changing situation: Outsourcing. 
Dependence is an important aspect of the outsourcing situation. There are other situations 
characterised by change, where trust is an issue in making strategies possible or not: Fusions 
between companies entail a need for amalgamation of values, traditions (interpretative 
schemes), ways of governance and action. In the restructuring of an industrial customer’s 
supplier networks, trust is probably important and may determine the changes. Expansion by 
e.g. internationalisation and other changes deserve further studies, as well as the opposite 
situation, downsizing. This study has been performed as an ex post study since the processes 
were well under way enabling each party’ reflections over the process. Another way could be 
simultaneous process studies, which may bring interesting perspectives on action going on. 
 
So far we have discussed implication between firms, on firm level. What can be done on 
industry level to promote business action processes on firm level? The role in this sense is to 
promote communication and provide meeting arenas. Information exchange and arenas for 
that purpose are needed to support potential business partners embarking upon trust 
development. 
 
On regional level, actors, roles and forms of cooperation vary between countries as well as 
between regions inside a country. In the interviews in this study, respondents have pointed at 
the role of trust between actors in the region as well as locally. Structures such as supplier 
networks (a virtual firm structure where suppliers cooperate in making offers and production), 
supplier parks (cooperation and organising between industrial customers, suppliers and other 
resource providers in an area) all have trust as a basis for initiatives as well as performance. 
                                                 
3
 Both symmetric and asymmetric dependence can be fruitful. The important thing is that the parties agree on 
their interpretation of dependence.     
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Experiences from trust development in such structures and from their forming processes can 
be interesting to study to benefit new cooperative initiatives. 
 
What can be done by society on a national level to promote business action processes on firm 
level? Partly the role must be the same as on industry level: Information exchange and arenas 
for that purpose. But since society’s role is policy-making, including norm setting and norm 
interpretation (laws and regulations), trust on firm level will be promoted by clear-cut rules of 
the game, which – among other things – will reduce the risks that parties in an exchange will 
go to disjointed action due to different interpretations of what society requires from firms in 
business. As shown by (Lane and Bachmann, 1996), trust-based relations between buyer and 
supplier firms in Britain and Germany are highly dependent on the existence of stable legal, 
political and social institutions. The issue deserves more comparative studies in different 
countries to cover cultural differences and similarities. To be aware of such differences and 
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Appendix 
 
Statements from five interview respondents concerning trust 
(translation from Swedish) 
 
The CEO of a supplier: Trust is 
- built on personal relations 
- professionality: in behaviour, competence in-house 
- competence in managing the production 
- timeliness 
- quality 
- managing flexibility and adaption towards the customer, e.g the need to split up delivery 
instead of being delayed 
- building on dialogue when things go wrong. Managing problem situations. Correcting what 
has gone wrong. See the problems and situation and maybe adjust to one another. 
- mutually contributing to solutions 
- active communication with personal contact is important for trust. Active seeking of 
solutions when required by the situation. Not to be anomymous. 
- giving signals of competence about your product and the business process 
 
The CEO of a supplier: Trust is 
- close relations physically and mentally 
- when you have succeeded in joint work with systems 
- having reference projects 
- having reference customers 
- knowing the customer well 
- managing exchange of resources 
 
The CEO of a supplier. Trust is 
- quality 
- timeliness in delivery 
- showing competence in managing production, displaying short lead times and short 
production time 
- displaying success in forecasting 
- managing stocks and material 
- agreements backed up by  
- contact/relations,  
- reliability in promises 
- showing responsibility 
- having reference companies 
- competence  
- straight communication 
- dialogue 
- willingness to give and take 
- being observant to the other party’s situations 
 
The CEO of a supplier: Trust is 
- yielding sometimes in important matters, such as prices 
- having developed a good network 
- personal relations     
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- values, such as honesty in negociations 
- know each other also outside work 
- having a good dialogue 
- helping each other 
 
 
Purchasing director of an industrial customer: Trust is 
- when the supplier has short lead times for fast delivery 
- quality 
- timeliness 
- displaying efficient production 
- living up to expectations 
- competence 
- respect for each other in business relation 
- keeping promises 
- keeping yourself what you demand of others 
- that both parties have a common view on the rules of the game 
- that the other party fulfils his goal when they are also important for us. 